This paper analyzes the double-dividend issues within an overlapping generations models framework. We characterize the necessary conditions for the obtention of a double dividend, i.e. an improvement of environmental and non-environmental welfare when the revenue of the pollution tax is recycled by a change of the labor tax rate. We show that, for an economy initially characterized by under-accumulation, when the budget-neutral fiscal reform requires a decrease of the labor tax rate, conditions may be defined to simultaneously allow (i) in the short term, an improvement of the welfare of both present generations; in the long term, (ii) the obtention of a double dividend, and (iii) the economy getting closer to the golden rule.
Introduction
One of the advantages of the environmental tax is that it provides a public revenue which can be recycled. This is the reason why it is often preferred to subsidies or emission quotas. Several authors like Terkla [27] , Parry [23] , or Poterba [25] argued that this revenue recycling could reduce or even annihilate the gross cost of the implementation of an environmental tax. As governments use the revenues from pollution taxes to decrease other distortionary taxes, environmental taxes may lead to a double dividend, according to Goulder's definition, by improving the environmental quality and achieving a less distortionary tax system (Goulder [15] ). Baumol and Oates [2] , Pearce [24] or Oates [22] suggested that these efficiency gains could be a powerful argument in favor of environmental taxation. But a great number of theoretical and empirical works refute the double dividend hypothesis (Bovenberg and de Mooij [6] , [7] and [8] , Bovenberg and van der Ploeg [9] , [10] and [12] , Parry [23] or Goulder [16] and Bovenberg and Goulder [4] ) and on the opposite, assess, that environmental taxes exacerbate, rather than alleviate, preexisting tax distortions.
Beside these potential efficiency properties, environmental decisions have an impact on the welfare of both current and future generations, since environmental quality is a public good that different generations share. These intergenerational issues on environmental externalities 1 or on taxation 2 have been widely studied in the economic literature. In a framework close to ours, John et alii [19] examine the effect of an environmental tax whose revenue is financing a public pollution abatement activity. Fisher and van Marrewijk [14] , using an endogenous growth model with pollution, derive the conditions for a pollution tax not to slow economic growth. Bovenberg and Heijdra [5] examine the effects of a green tax on polluting capital when the tax revenue is redistributed by lump-sum intergenerational transfers. This tax benefits the younger generation but harms the older ones. Without studying the double dividend issue, all these studies conclude that environmental taxation implies such a welfare loss for older generations that its implementation can not be wished: one of the generation which would decide it would also bear the heaviest burden.
The potential contradiction between efficiency and equity has been already emphasized by 1 cf. Howarth and Norgaard [17] , Marini and Scaramozzinno [21] . 2 cf. Kotlikoff and Summers [20] , Ihori T. [18] . some works in other frameworks. While the double dividend hypothesis is rejected when the economy is made of one productive sector, using only one productive factor (labor), and one representative consumer (Bosello, Carraro and Galeotti [3] ), when instead there are several productive factors and/or several consumer groups, the double dividend can be obtained but at the expense of equity (Bovenberg and van der Ploeg [11] , Proost and van Regemorter [26] ).
Our analyze of the double-dividend and welfare distribution issues takes place within a framework of overlapping generations models which seems more convenient for analyzing such environmental problems. In the absence of altruism, the behavior of private agents is responsible for an intergenerational environmental externality. The consumption activity of present generation causes emissions of pollutants which deteriorate the environmental quality, harming the welfare of all future generations. The solution which is usually advocated in order to internalize this kind of externality is the implementation of environmental taxation (pigovian taxes). But such taxes imply non-environmental welfare losses for the generations bearing them.
The main contribution of our paper is then to integrate both the efficiency and intergenerational distributional aspects of environmental taxes: we examine whether a revenueneutral increase in the pollution tax compensated by a change of the labor tax can yields a double dividend and whether this higher pollution tax can be Pareto improving.
The model is presented in the second section of this paper. It relies on standard assumptions of the overlapping generations framework (Allais [1] , Diamond [13] ). The economy consists of two periods lived individuals being affected by the quality of the environment only when being old. The government is financing its spending with a labor tax, a consumption tax and the pollution tax. In the third section, we specify the budget-neutral reform. In the next section, we characterize the necessary conditions for the obtention of both dividends, an improvement respectively of non-environmental welfare and of environmental welfare. In section 5, we examine the compatibility conditions of both dividends: these conditions depend on the capital intensity of the initial steady state equilibrium relative to the golden rule. Section 6 shows that the fiscal change does not always harm the welfare of the present generations and that, under certain assumptions about agents' preferences, it is possible to obtain both a long term double dividend and the respect of short term intergenerational equity.
The model
We assume that N t individuals are born in period t. Population grows at constant rate n therefore N t = (1 + n) N t−1 . Each individual supplies one unit of labor 3 when she is young and earns a wage w t ; she divides her labor income between consumption and saving s t . In the second period the individual consumes her saving and the interest she earns.
The welfare of an individual born at t is measured with the intertemporal separable utility function:
with c y t denoting the first-period consumption of the agent born at t, c o t+1 her secondperiod consumption and π t+1 the per capita level of pollution at t + 1. The intertemporal discount rate is β/(1 − β) (with 0 < β < 1) and γ is the weight of the pollution externality in the welfare evaluation (γ > 0). Assume that the three instantaneous components of the utility function, u, v and z exhibit the usual properties: they are increasing in their argument, strictly concave and satisfy the Inada conditions. The assumption that pollution only affects the older' welfare is the extreme case of any situation in which the older would be assumed to be more sensitive than the younger to the degradation of the environmental quality (because of their wealth state but also because the satisfaction supplied by their leisure depends upon the environmental quality) 4 .
The real interest rate is r t+1 . At period t, the tax rate on consumption is τ c t and the pollution tax rate τ e t . The pollution is assumed to be due to consumption, with a the emission rate of pollutants (see below). The household's budget constraints can be written as follows:
The intertemporal budget constraint of the agent born at t is given by: 
This relation determines the optimal consumption and saving path of the representative household, within the Diamond's framework (Diamond [13] ) with a homothetic utility function 5 :
The production sector consists of many firms, each of them being characterized by the same production function which has constant returns to scale and satisfies the Inada conditions. Output per capita y t is a function of capital per capita k t , i.e. y t = f (k t ).
The maximization problem of the representative firm is (taking the output price as numeraire):
with τ w t the rate of labor tax, w t the real wage rate and δ the depreciation rate of capital. Since markets are competitive, capital and labor earn their marginal products:
5 With this assumption, saving depends only on the wage rate.
We assume that government spending is entirely financed by current taxes. The government's budget constraint is that its purchases (g t per capita) must equal, at each period t, its fiscal revenues generated by the consumption tax, the pollution tax and the labor tax. The equilibrium of the per capita government's budget is:
The pollution flow is assumed to be due to the household's consumption (waste production, for example), but the household's welfare is affected by the per capita stock of pollution π t+1 during the second-period of her life, whose dynamics is described by the following equation:
where h is the constant rate of natural absorption of pollution (0 < h < 1) and a > 0 the emission rate of pollutants. This specification encompasses both intra-and intergenerational externalities.
The equilibrium of the output good market can be written as follows:
which yields, by substituting the zero-profit condition, the government's budget constraint (eq.7) and the household's budget constraints (eq.2) to the following equation:
which is similar to the equilibrium condition of the capital market, meaning that the capital stock in period t + 1 is the amount saved by young individuals in period t.
Substituting the real wage and the interest rate resulting of profit maximization (eq.6) into the optimal consumptions and saving of household yield their values at the decentralized equilibrium:
The dynamics of the economy is obtained by using the equilibrium of the capital market (eq.10):
This equation implicitly defines k t+1 as a function of k t . The steady state equilibrium is defined by k t+1 = k t =k, withk satisfying the following equation of k:
With the homothetic utility function, the steady state per capita capital stock is independent of the consumption tax rate τ c and of the pollution tax rate τ e :
At the steady state equilibrium, the per capita stock of pollution is given by:
3 The specification of the fiscal reform
We assume an exogenous increase of the pollution tax rate, imposed by the government in order to control pollution. The amount of government's purchases are assumed ex post invariant. This increase dτ e of the pollution tax rate causes a variation of the labor tax rate dτ w . At the steady state equilibrium, the government's budget constraint (eq.7) can be written as follows:
The link between the variations of the pollution tax and of the labor tax is obtained through the differentiation of this constraint. Any balanced fiscal reform is characterized by the following relationship between dτ e and dτ w :
with, Λ the balanced fiscal reform multiplier :
where E x/y denotes the elasticity of variable x relative to variable y.
The effects of the labor tax on the wage rate and the interest rate are respectively measured by the parameters Φ and Ψ. Φ = w τ w E w/τ w + E w/k E k/τ w measures both the direct and indirect effects of τ w on the real wage rate: it is negative. Both effects are going the same way. As the per capita capital stock remains constant, the labor productivity, (1 + τ w )ŵ, is unchanged and the wage rate may increase in order to compensate a decrease of the labor tax (E w/τ w < 0): this is the direct effect. The second effect is an indirect one: a decrease of the labor tax rate enhances the per capita capital stock (E k/τ w < 0) and increases the marginal product of labor and consequently its rate of return (E w/k > 0).
∂k ∂τ w captures only the indirect effect of τ w on the real interest rate. In case of a decrease of the labor tax, the per capita capital stock rises ( ∂k ∂τ w < 0) leading then to a decrease of the marginal product of capital and thus of its rate of return ( ∂r ∂k < 0).
It might be expected that a cut in labor tax would be in any case allowed by an increase in the pollution tax rate, but we will now show that it is not the case here: on one hand, the budget is assumed to be balanced ex post during each period, and on the other hand, the variation of the per capita capital stock yields opposite effects on the wage rate and the interest rate which are the main determinants of consumption (eq.12).
Proposition 1
The sign of the balanced fiscal reform multiplier Λ is a priori undetermined and depends on the initial tax rates and on the values of the various elasticities.
Proof. (i)
The numerator measures the effect of the change in pollution tax rate on its revenue. There are both a value effect (the tax revenue increases with the tax rate, for unchanged consumption) and a fiscal base effect (consumption decreases as the tax rate increases, thus the fiscal base erodes) which work in opposite ways. As a result, this term might be positive or negative.
(ii)
on wages) on fiscal revenues of consumption and pollution taxes. There is only a fiscal base effect.
r E c o /r Ψ < 0 is the effect of the change of τ w (via the total effects on the interest rate) on the fiscal revenues of consumption tax and of pollution tax levied on the older. There is only a fiscal base effect.
(iv)ŵ + τ w Φ ≷ 0 is the effect of the change of τ w on its fiscal revenue. There are both a value effect (the fiscal revenue increases with the tax rate, for unchanged wage) and a fiscal base effect (the wage decreases as the tax rate increases, thus the fiscal base erodes).
As the sign of the numerator and of the first term of the denominator is undetermined, the sign of the necessary change in the labor tax is also undetermined.
One could think that the case where a rise in labor tax is required could not lead to a double dividend situation but we will show later that conclusions are not so straightforward.
The welfare effects of the fiscal reform
One can measure the welfare effects of small fiscal changes by the marginal excess burden. This marginal excess burden corresponds to the additional income that needs to be provided to the representative household to keep her utility at its initial level: this is the compensatory income variation, denoted dR c . It stands for the excess welfare loss of the consumers over the tax revenues collected by the government and can be interpreted as the hidden costs of financing public spending: a positive value for the marginal excess burden indicates a loss in welfare after the fiscal reform.
We examine here the welfare effects of the fiscal change for a generation during its life-cycle, once the final steady state equilibrium is reached 6 .
Let us determine the compensatory income variation which, after the fiscal reform (dτ w = Λ dτ e ), would let the level of life-cycle utility unchanged (dU = 0):
We use the first-order conditions of the representative household's program (eq.4) and the definition of the compensatory income variation dR c :
dw + dR c =ĉ y dp y + p y dc y +ĉ o dp o + p o dc o this leads to:
One can distinguish an environmental component dR e c dR e c = p o γ ∂z/∂π ∂v/∂c o dπ and a nonenvironmental one dR ne c (dR ne c = −dw +ĉ y dp y +ĉ o dp o ) . The compensatory income variation is then:
As the increase in environmental welfare becomes higher, as well as the increase in consumption prices and the wage decrease become lower, the resulting compensatory income variation will be smaller.
The environmental dividend: the first dividend
The variation of environmental welfare depends both on the sensitivity of welfare to per capita pollution and on the sensitivity of pollution to the consumption of the two generations 7 . Differentiating the expression for the steady-state per capita pollution stock (eq.13) yields:
Where the consumption variations are given by the following expressions:
-first-period consumption: negative, because of the decrease of the wage rate and the rise in the first period consumption price. At the contrary, in case of a cut in labor tax, consumption will decrease only if the negative effect of the pollution tax is greater than the positive effect allowed by the wage augmentation (Φ < 0).
-second-period consumption: Finally, the variation of per capita pollution is obtained by: 
At each period of the household's life, when the rise in the pollution tax rate can be balanced through a reduction of the tax rate on labor, the final effect on consumption will be negative if and only if the income effect is lower than the price effect, that is if the consumption rise due to wage increase is more than compensated by the decrease due to price augmentation.
Then, the lower are the income effects as compared to the price effects and the easier the first dividend will be obtained.
The existence conditions of a second dividend
In this framework, the second dividend is obtained when the non-environmental compensatory income variation is negative (dR ne c < 0). The final result will depend on the effect of the fiscal reform on the wage rate and on prices.
-welfare effect through the wage:
, but as the sign of Λ is ambiguous, the effect on wage is undetermined. If the pollution tax rise is balanced by a decrease of the tax rate on labor, the wage will increase, playing in favor of the double dividend hypothesis (the marginal excess burden would be lower).
-welfare effects through price variations:        dp y = ∂p y ∂τ e dτ e dp o = ∂p o ∂τ e + ∂p o ∂r Ψ Λ dτ e ⇔    dp y = a dτ e dp o = 1
The first-period consumption price increases unambiguously but the second-period price may diminish if Λ > 0 (because the second-period price decreases when the discount rate r rises for Ψ > 0). In case of a decrease of the tax rate on labor (Λ < 0), both prices are increasing which leads to rise the marginal excess burden of the fiscal reform.
The final effect on non-environmental welfare is measured by the compensatory income variation dR ne c :
= −dw +ĉ y dp y +ĉ o dp
Even in the more intuitive case of a decrease of the labor tax (Λ < 0) and of reduction of both consumptions (Λ y c < 0 and Λ o c < 0 or at least of global consumption (1 + n) Λ y c + Λ o c < 0) which leads to an environmental dividend, the double dividend can not always be obtained. It depends on the relative magnitude of the effects on the wage, on the environmental welfare and on the fiscal base of the pollution tax.
Double Dividends and the Golden Rule
In this section, we analyze the compatibility conditions between both dividends.
Rewriting dR ne c (eq.15) while differentiating the equilibrium household's budget constraint (eq.3), leads to the following new definition of the non-environmental compensatory income variation:
We can thus note that the second dividend can not occur if both consumptions fall;
symmetrically, the first dividend will be excluded if both consumptions rise. Finally, the only case of double dividend is the one where both consumptions go in opposite ways. We will limit the study to this case.
Moreover, if we refer to the optimum defined by the golden rule 8 , we must take into account a new criterion in order to analyze the implications of such a fiscal reform. In a competitive framework, the inefficiency property of the overlapping generations models 9 requires to distinguish two double dividend cases: the first one is called Golden Double Dividend because it brings the competitive economy closer to the golden rule while the second one moves the economy away from the golden rule.
Definition 2 A double dividend situation is called Golden Double Dividend when the postreform per capita capital stock gets closer to the per capita capital stock set by the golden rule (k g ). 8 The golden rule determines the per capita capital stockk g which maximizes the steady state consumption. It is given by the equality between the net capital return f k g − δ and the growth rate of population n. One can easily show thatkg is also here the optimal per capita capital stock with an undiscounted welfare criterion. 9 The competitive equilibrium of an OLG model is not optimal: it is characterized either by overaccumulationk >kg (or equivalentlyr < n) or under-accumulationk <kg.
We show that, whatever the sign of the variation in the labor tax rate τ w implied by the environmental fiscal reform, a double dividend can occur in both cases, and moreover, that the obtention of a double dividend depends on the capital intensity of the initial steady state.
Case of an increase of the labor tax rate
We consider first the case of a budget-neutral fiscal environmental reform requiring an increase of the labor tax rate (Λ > 0).
Proposition 3
When the rise in the pollution tax requires an increase of the labor tax rate, a double dividend can occur if and only if the economy initially over-accumulateŝ k > k g . It is then a Golden Double Dividend.
Proof. The direct effect of an increase of τ w is a decrease of the per capita capital stock, which automatically increases the interest rate but reduces the wage rate. The price p y raises, decreasing therefore the first period consumption (dc y < 0). The existence condition of the double dividend bears then on dc o (it must be positive) and then on dp o . It can be shown that dp o decreases if 1 < (ii) the second dividend requires − p y p o dc y < dc o . Combining these two constraints requireŝ r < n. These necessary conditions can be summarized as:
In this case, when the double dividend is obtained, the fiscal policy decreases the steady state per capita capital stock. The economy gets closer to the optimal capital stock defined by the golden rule. This property follows from the rise in second period consumption which is not obtained through an increase of saving but through a rise in the rate of return (dk < 0, dr > 0).
Case of a decrease of the labor tax rate
We consider now the case of a decrease of the labor tax rate (Λ < 0). In this case, the mechanisms are more complicated and we have to consider various cases. Therefore the capital stock increase drives the interest rate down, which along with the pollution tax increase, push the consumption prices for both generations up dp y > 0 and dp o > 0.
This restrictive effect might be overbalanced by a rise in wage, a revenue effect. The combination of the price effect with the revenue effect can lead to, whether (i) an increase of the consumption of the younger, dc y > 0, and a decrease of the older's consumption, dc o < 0, or (ii) the symmetrical case dc y < 0 and dc o > 0.
Proposition 4 When the rise in the pollution tax requires a decrease of the labor tax rate, a double dividend can occur if the economy initially under-accumulatesk < k g . It is then a Golden Double Dividend.
Proof. The first dividend is obtained if and only if (1 + n) dc y < −dc o . The second dividend will be reached if −dc o < p y p o dc y . Combining these two conditions leads to the necessary existence condition of a double dividend: n <r ork < k g . Hence, these necessary conditions can be summarized as:
The economy needs to be initially dynamic-efficient. Then, the fiscal policy increases the steady state per capita capital stock and there may be a double dividend. This policy brings the long term capital stock closer to its optimal level. But the old generation suffers a consumption loss, without any compensation.
Proposition 5 When the rise in the pollution tax requires a decrease of the labor tax rate, a double dividend can occur if the economy initially over-accumulatesk > k g . It is not a Golden one.
Proof. The proof follows the same reasoning as in case of a labor tax increase (cf Proposition 3). The necessary conditions can be summarized as:
In this case, the environmental reform increases the steady state per capita capital stock away from its golden rule level.
In this section, we measure the welfare variation of the young and old generations in order to address the issue of the inter-generations distributional effects of the fiscal reform.
We are searching here to know if there is any possibility for the environmental reform not to imply any welfare loss for the generations bearing it. In our static framework, we consider a small departure from the initial steady state. Let us define the compensatory income variation of the young generation dR y and of the old generation dR o as:
Let us examine the different cases in accordance with the sign of the variation of the labor tax rate.
In the case of an increase of the labor tax rate, the young generation suffers unambiguously a welfare loss: firstly, the increase of the pollution tax rises the consumption price, and secondly the labor tax rate increase causes revenue losses. Furthermore, the old generation also suffers a non environmental welfare loss 10 but, by contrast with the younger one, it benefits from the improvement of the environmental conditions because the first dividend is obtained. If the first dividend is greater than the non environmental welfare loss, the old generation may enjoy a global welfare gain.
When the labor tax rate decreases, both generations can either benefit or suffer from the reform. As far as the young generation is concerned, the negative price effect induced by the rise in the pollution tax rate may be compensated by a positive revenu effect allowed by the drop of the labor tax rate. The final welfare effect is positive if its initial consumption is not too large (c y * < ΦΛ a ). The old generation may enjoy an improvement of its non environmental welfare (in addition with the potential environmental one) if a < p o ΨΛ, that is if dp o decreases.
Finally, this last case is the only one which may allow the fiscal reform not to harm any of the existing generations at the moment of implementation of the environmental fiscal reform.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that, contrary to the intuition, a balanced environmental fiscal reform may result either in an increase or a decrease of the labor tax rate, depending on the elasticies of consumption and of the initial tax rates. A double dividend may be obtained in both cases but its existence conditions rely on the initial per capita capital stock. When the labor tax rate increases, the double dividend may only occur in case or initial over-accumulation, it is a Golden Doublel Dividend (as it gets the economy closer to the golden rule) but the young generation will be harmed by the reform. At the contrary, when the labor tax rate decreases to balance the rise of the pollution tax rate, a double dividend may be obtained either in over or in under-accumulation. Nevertheless, the case of under-accumulation is the only one which may allow (i) in the short term, an improvement of the welfare of both present generations, in the long term, (ii) the obtention of a double dividend, and (iii) the economy getting closer to the golden rule. This last property can be interpreted as the third dividend of the environmental policy.
